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Abstract 
In recent years market discipline attracted interest as a mechanism to augment or to 
partially replace government oversight (discipline) of the financial sector, specifically 
depository institutions. Despite the abundance of research, mostly empirical studies, in 
the area no formal model has been presented to analyze the different aspects of the issue. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap. In our model we incorporate the characteristics of the 
regulatory structure and market discipline and examine the effects of several parameters 
on the optimal decisions of the bank. For example we consider the effects of changes in 
risk, deposit insurance coverage, and degree of market discipline. In most cases our 
results are compatible with recent empirical findings. 
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 BANK MANAGEMENT AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The stakeholders in a firm can monitor and control behavior through the use of 
market mechanisms .The ability to influence the cost and quantity of funds available to 
the firm, as well as the valuation of its assets, provides a market-based structure for 
corporate governance (market discipline). Market discipline is considered optimal for 
corporate governance as is evident in unregulated industries. This paradigm for 
governance, in particular by debtholders may not apply to financial institutions, 
especially depository institutions. Most of the liabilities of thrifts are not traded in the 
market so debtholders lack opportunities to exercise market discipline. Moreover, the 
government that provides much of the governance of these institutions through regulatory 
and supervisory mechanisms also guarantees a large part of the liabilities of depositories. 
Specifically, because of deposit insurance, depositors have no incentive to monitor the 
bank. This asymmetry has been widely noted and many observers have asked how market 
discipline can be applied to financial institutions.  Although many suggestions have been 
made, there is no modeling framework for evaluating them.  In this paper, we analyze 
market discipline in the context of optimal bank behavior.   
Depository institutions are highly regulated to protect against the disruption of the 
unique services they provide to avoid the social costs (negative externalities) this would 
impose on the economy. One of the main goals of regulation and supervision is to 
promote the safety and soundness of the financial system1. In the last decades there has 
been increased financial instability in the form financial crises including banking and 
currency crises in many countries2. It seems that traditional regulatory mechanisms are 
                                                 
1 See Paroush (1988) on the domino effect and the need for supervision in banking. 
2 See Williamson (2001) for a review of a volume of reports on financial crisis including banking and 
currency crises: Krugman, Paul ed. Currency crises. NBER Conference Report series. University of 
Chicago Press, 2000. 
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either not well applied or do not suffice, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) who 
find that deposit insurance is detrimental to bank stability.3    
As a result of these developments market discipline attracted the interest of 
academics, regulators and bankers as a mechanism to augment or to a certain degree 
replace government oversight of the financial sector. The third pillar (element) of the 
proposed new Basel Capital banking Accord (Basel II) is market discipline. ” The 
committee emphasizes the potential for market discipline to reinforce capital regulation 
and other supervisory efforts in promoting safety and soundness in banks and financial 
system”4.  
            The literature on market discipline in banking is limited to a policy literature that 
discusses various proposals, such as mandatory subordinated debt See Crockett (2002)5, 
and an empirical literature that looks at the effect of bank risk on some available market 
measures, for a review of U.S. empirical evidence see Flannery (1998).   However, there 
is no theoretical framework that analyzes the different aspects of the incorporation of 
market discipline into corporate governance of financial institutions, and that offers 
insights and solutions to the different issues, such as how to model market discipline and 
measure its effect, effects of a change in regulation or risk faced by the institution. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by modeling market discipline in a framework of 
optimal bank behavior.  
 Our model, in which the bank is assumed to maximize expected profits, 
incorporates the characteristics of the regulatory structure and market discipline. Market 
discipline is considered here as the “direct” effect of the risk of the bank’s assets and its 
capital structure on the cost of its uninsured funds. We define the degree of market 
discipline to be the sensitivity of the cost of uninsured deposits with respect to the capital 
structure adjusted for the risk of the bank. Government regulation is introduced via 
deposit insurance provided to part of the depositors.  The model enables us to examine 
and derive the effects of several parameters on the bank and compare these to empirical 
                                                 
3In the U.S. the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s demonstrated how forbearance of the supervisor could 
increase the cost of a crisis. As a result the FDICIA of 1991 mandated least cost resolution of failing banks 
and prompt corrective action by the FDIC. 
4 That is market discipline, to be facilitated by disclosure of meaningful information by banks, is supposed 
to augment regulatory discipline. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). 
5 See for example Sundaresan (2001) who examines the desirability of incorporating market discipline in 
bank supervision and regulation. And explores the use of equity prices as signals of bank credit risk. 
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findings. We consider the effects of a change in risk of the bank, deposit insurance 
coverage and price, degree of market discipline, on the optimal behavior of the bank, 
such as the optimal quantities of insured and uninsured deposits. In most cases the results 
are compatible with existing empirical findings and thus the model can serve as a 
theoretical framework for explaining bank management decisions and the effects of 
market discipline.   
Market discipline has a number of definitions in the literature, Kwast et al. (1999) 
distinguishes between “direct” and “indirect” effects of the market. The “direct” effect is 
when investors can influence the risk taking of the bank by affecting the cost and/or 
quantity of funds; Flannery (2001) refers to this as “market influence”. This is the 
definition used in this paper. The interaction of the supervisor’s information with that of 
the market is refereed to as the “indirect effect”. 
 The paper is organized as follows: section II presents a model of a bank that manages 
only its liabilities (assets are assumed fixed).  We derive equilibrium values from the first 
order conditions as well as results of comparative statics analysis with respect to a 
number of parameters of our model. In Section III we relax the assumption of fixed assets 
and consider a bank that manages both its assets and liabilities (ALM). In both sections 
the results are calibrated with empirical findings. The main results and concluding 
remarks are presented in section IV. 
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II. The Liability Management Model 
 
We start with a bank whose optimal decision about its assets has already been made and 
they are now fixed, thus the bank only manages its liabilities.  The bank has two types of 
liabilities: insured deposits and uninsured large deposits,6 and is assumed to pay a deposit 
insurance premium on its total deposits7. Market discipline is introduced through a risk 
premium charged by the uninsured bank debtholders. The risk premium can be 
considered a function of the risk of the assets of the bank and its leverage measured by 
the equity capital ratio of the bank and where equity serves as a cushion against future 
losses. Thus market discipline is modeled in our analysis as the effect of the bank’s risk 
and capital structure on the cost of its funds. This is referred to in the literature as the 
“direct” effect of market discipline, see Kwast et al. (1999). The rates and quantities of 
the two types of deposits are assumed to be determined in two separate markets. In the 
more competitive and less regulated uninsured deposits market (national or even 
international market) the bank is assumed to face an infinitely elastic supply function8; 
while the insured deposits market (“local market” of households and small business) is 
less competitive due also to regulation that restricts competition, like the restrictions on 
branching and interstate banking that existed until recently in the USA. In this market we 
assume that the supply curve of deposits is positively slopped. In addition the bank has 
equity capital and faces an increasing cost of raising equity. Because of uncertainty about 
the value of the assets of the bank and the capital structure of the bank (equity capital not 
enough to offset the decline in asset value relative to liabilities) the bank may fail with 
some positive probability. This probability of insolvency may thus be considered a 
function of two variables: the risk of the assets of the bank and the financial leverage of 
the bank.  
                                                 
6 We do not consider explicitly non –deposit liabilities like federal funds and repurchase agreements. They 
are short term, inter-bank transactions and as such are not very relevant to the main issue of our paper 
namely market discipline. Non-deposit liabilities (borrowings and other liabilities) total 26.8% of all bank 
liabilities in the U.S. (FDIC December 31, 2000) 
7 Currently the FDIC insures deposits up to a limit of $100,000. The insurance premium however is paid on 
all domestic deposits of all sizes. 
8 Uninsured deposits are large-denominated deposits held mostly by corporations, mutual funds and other 
financial institutions 
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The (expected) net income (NI) function of the bank can now be written9: 
[ ]{ } ( ) )1()()()()()()( 10011000 LCEkDrDDErrDrLrEPNI L −−+−+−= λ
 
At this stage of the analysis the asset composition is assumed to be given, as the bank is 
only managing its liabilities, rL is the interest rate on the fixed loans of the bank L. Where 
P is the probability of survival of the bank, (1-P) is the probability of the bank’s 
insolvency. Given that L is fixed the probability of survival is assumed to be an 
increasing function of the equity capital of the bank E which serves as a cushion against 
future losses of the bank; r0 is the interest rate on the insured deposits D0 which denotes 
the supply function of deposits and is increasing in r0; r1 is the interest rate on the 
uninsured deposits D1, which includes a risk premium that is an inverse function of 
equity capital E. In other words the uninsured depositors exercise their market discipline 
via the required interest rate on their deposits. If the bank’s equity is lowered and 
consequently the probability of insolvency (1-P) is increased the interest rate r1 will also 
increase. The parameter λ is the deposit insurance premium rate charged on all deposits; 
k is the cost of equity capital and is an increasing function of E. The operating cost C (L) 
is a fixed cost as long as L is constant. 
The budget (balance sheet) constraint is:  L=D0(r0)+D1+E. Since L is fixed, the uninsured 
deposits D1 are by definition the residual liability that equates both sides of the balance 
sheet:  
 
)2()( 001 ErDLD −−=  
 
The market for uninsured deposits is significantly more competitive than the insured 
deposits market, we assume for simplicity without loss of generality that the supply 
function of uninsured deposits is infinitely elastic for every r1.
Assuming risk neutrality the objective of the bank is to maximize its expected net income 
NI w.r.t E and r0 subject to the budget constrain. Substituting (2) in (1) we obtain NI as 
an unconstrained target function: 
 
                                                 
9  In case of failure we assume NI=0.               
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Note that since total assets are fixed total deposits decline as equity E increases.  
We will now derive the first order conditions for the two decision variables of the bank: E 
and r0.  First differentiate the objective function w.r.t. E: 
 
( )30=−+∂
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E
P
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E
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Where Π is the net interest income (NII): 
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Where 0
1
11 <=
r
E
dE
drr
Eη  is the elasticity of r1 w.r.t. E. The absolute value of this elasticity 
can be considered a measure of the (degree) of market discipline. If it equals zero there is 
no market discipline and the greater it is the greater is the degree of market discipline.  
The first order condition can be written as an equality of the marginal revenue and 
marginal cost of equity: 
 
( )6
dE
dk
E
P
dE
dP =+∂
Π∂+Π λ  
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The marginal revenue (LHS of (6)) has three components: the direct effect of E on the 
probability of survival P; the indirect effect, via market discipline, 
E
P ∂
Π∂  is larger as the 
market discipline 1rEη  is larger; the third factor λ reflects the saving in insurance 
premium due to a decrease in deposits as E increases, where in the current model total 
assets are fixed. Moreover the effect of λ on the marginal revenue of E is smaller if the 
deposit insurance premium is risk adjusted. Thus, assuming that risk adjusted λ is a 
decreasing function of E, we modify (6) to be: 
)6(1 a
dE
dkE
dE
d
E
P
dE
dP =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++∂
Π∂+Π λ
λλ  
Where the last term on the LHS of (6a) is the risk adjusted insurance premium where by 
definition 0<
dE
dλ  and also the elasticity 0<λ
λ E
dE
d  
Thus adjusting the insurance premium is equivalent to reducing λ since 
λλ
λλ <⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ + E
dE
d1 . The result will be equity capital E will that is  smaller than in the case 
of a flat premium, this can be seen in Figure 1: E**<E* because of the negative effect of E 
on the insurance premium, where E* is optimal equity when the insurance premium is flat 
(constant) following (6), and E** is optimal equity when the insurance premium is risk 
adjusted following (6a). 
 
 Insert FIGURE 1 
 
We now focus on the first order condition w.r.t. r0 
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The LHS of  (7) is the marginal cost of the interest rate on insured deposits: the increase 
in the cost of insured deposits r0D0 as r0 increases, and the RHS of (7) is the marginal 
revenue: the decrease in cost of the uninsured deposits. An internal solution requires that 
in equilibrium r1>r0, otherwise the bank would raise no insured deposits. 
Rewriting the condition in terms of the elasticity of the supply function of insured 
deposits D0 w.r.t r0 , 
0
0
0
00
0 D
r
dr
dDD
r =η ,we obtain 
0
0
0
0
11
)8(
01
)(
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
D
r
D
r
r
r
or
r
ErPD
r
NI
η
η
+=
=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=∂
∂
 
As the market for insured deposits becomes more competitive the supply elasticity 
increases and the risk premium (ratio of r1 to r0) will decline.  The implication is that with 
the recent deregulation in US banking, that removed restrictions on banking activities, it 
may expected that the supply curve of insured deposits will become more elastic (as the 
effective size of the market increases from a local to a national market) and the rate 
differential (r1-r0) will decline. Further analysis of this point is presented in the next 
section. 
 
We assume that the second derivatives: 
 
2
1
2
2
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
,,,
dE
rd
dr
Dd
dE
Pd
dE
kd   have the proper signs so that the second order conditions 
hold globally i.e.: 
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 In Figure 2 the two lines EE’ and rr’ illustrate the FOC (6) and (7) respectively. The 
optimal solutions of E and r0 are presented as the intersection of the two lines. 
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Insert FIGURE 2 
 
Each of the lines is a relationship between E and r0 as derived from the relevant first 
order condition. The two lines have negative slopes and the EE’ line is steeper than the 
rr’ line, this follows from the sign of the cross derivatives and the second order 
conditions, see Appendix A. The relationships presented in Figure 2 will be used to trace 
the effects of changes in the parameters in the comparative statics analysis that follows. 
 
Comparative statics analysis 
We start with a comparative analysis of the impact of the parameters of the model on the 
decision variables r0 and E. 
 For a change in a generic parameter θ we differentiate the FOC (6) and (7) w.r.t. θ: 
)10(0
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And similarly  
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The last terms on the LHS of (10) and (11) are the direct effects of θ, while the other 
terms are the indirect effects through E and r0. 
 
The solutions of equations (10) and (11) for the two unknowns θθ d
dEand
d
dr0 , are the 
effects of a change in the parameter θ on r0 and E:         
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where by the second order conditions we have:  
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     In the following analysis we consider the effects of changes in six parameters on E 
and r0. For each we first attempt to motivate the change by providing a relevant 
historic background. Secondly we obtain the signs of θθ d
dEand
d
dr0  by substituting 
the relevant terms in (12). Finally we illustrate the results graphically by shifts of the 
EE’ and rr’ lines in Figure2, these are presented in Figure 3. The results are 
summarized in Table 1.          
 
We first analyze two cases involving the deposit insurance premium:  
1. Insurance premium λ increases and 
2.  Insurance premium is adjusted for risk λ(E) see (6a); interestingly this is 
equivalent to reducing λ since ( ) 01 <∂∂=<+ λληληλ λλ EEwhere EE . 
 
            The 1980’s U.S. dual crises of banking and savings and loans associations (S&L) 
resulted in a dramatic increase in failures of institutions to levels more than ten times 
greater than in the period 1934-1980. The crisis in banking is attributed to increased 
competition due to financial innovation and deregulation, while the savings and loans 
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crisis was caused mainly by interest rate risk (mismatch of long term mortgages and 
short term deposits). The crises were aggravated by moral hazard incentive provided 
by deposit insurance which increased risk taking by the financial intermediaries, and 
by regulatory forbearance that allowed failing institutions to continue to operate 
(“zombie” institutions). Increased losses of the FDIC (BIF) and the need to address 
problems of moral hazard created by deposit insurance resulted in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Major provisions of the 
act recapitalized the FDIC, mandated prompt corrective action and ordered the 
creation of risk-based deposit insurance premiums. See FDIC (2002).  
For an increase in λ, substituting θ = λ, in (12) 
01
0
22
=∂∂
∂=∂∂
∂
λλ r
NIand
E
NI   
Yielding as expected a decline in r0 (and D0) and an increase in E 
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Since λ does not appear in (7), the rr’ line is invariant under a change of λ. In order to 
retain the equality of (6) [or (6a)] following an increase [decrease] of λ we have to 
decrease [increase] the term 
dE
dP
dE
dP Π+Π  in this equation. In equilibrium, where 
0
0
=∂
Π∂
r
,  
The partial derivative of this term w.r.t. r0 is negative: 0
0
2
0
<∂∂
Π∂+∂
Π∂
rE
P
rdE
dP . 
Therefore for every E we have to increase [decrease] r0 which means an upward 
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[downward] shift of the EE’ line. Thus an increase in the insurance premium results 
in an increase [decrease] in the optimal value of E and a decline [increase] of the 
interest rate on insured deposits r0 (and also decline of D0), this is consistent with the 
inequalities of (13). See Figure 3a [3b].  
The policy implication of this result is that if the deposit insurance premium is 
adjusted for risk to reduce moral hazard, the supervisory authorities have either to 
increase the capital requirement or raise the insurance premium schedule, to prevent a 
reduction in equity capital by the banks. For a discussion of the socially optimal 
deposit insurance premium see Landskroner and Paroush (1994). 
 
3. The insured deposits market becomes more competitive 
Until recently competition in banking in the U.S. has been restricted by legislation 
that separated commercial banking from investment banking (Glass Steagall Act of 
1933), and limited state branching and interstate banking. Recent legislation removed 
these restrictions and that is expected to increase competition in banking. The Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permits bank holding 
companies to acquire banks in any state and allows interstate mergers, also most 
states reduced or eliminated branching restrictions. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 
1999 repealed the Glass Steagall Act, allowing commercial banks to engage in 
insurance and investment banking (securities). In our model increased competition is 
reflected by an increase in the supply elasticity of insured deposits. This was the 
market most restricted by previous regulation. 
 
For   00,
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Note that since  does not appear in (6), the EE’ line in Figure 2 is invariant under 
the change of . In order to retain the equality of (8) we have to increase r
0
0
D
rη
0
0
D
rη 0 for 
every value E, which means an upward shift of the rr’ line and thus optimal E 
declines while optimal r0 increases. These results are consistent with (14) and are 
illustrated in Figure3c. That is a less regulated and more competitive banking industry 
will result in higher interest rate paid on insured deposits, but lower equity capital 
which has implications for capital adequacy. 
 
4. The degree of market discipline - increases: 1rEη
The degree of market discipline can be considered a function of three factors: the level of 
coverage of deposit insurance (currently the limit is $100,000 per account) provided by 
the FDIC that is inversely related to market discipline (sensitivity of r1 to risk), as this 
limit is reduced more depositors become uninsured (leave the safety net) and have an 
incentive to monitor the bank; level of competition in the uninsured deposit market (may 
be measured by H the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) which is positively related to market 
discipline, in our model H=0 since we assume perfect competition in this market; the 
third factor is the expected recovery rate in case of bank failure, the higher the rate the 
smaller will be the degree of market discipline. 
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The elasticity  does not appear in (7) and thus 1rEη 1
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Note that since 0
1
>∂∂
∂
r
EE
NI
η  we have to decrease dE
dP
dE
dP Π+Π  in order to maintain 
the equality of (3). By the FOC we have 00
0
2
0
<∂∂
Π∂=Π
rE
and
dr
d , thus to retain the 
equilibrium we have to increase r0 for every E. This means an upward shift in the EE’ 
line, which results in an increase in E and a decline in r0, and which is consistent with 
(15), see Figure3a. Thus as the sensitivity of r1 to E increases r0 declines and E 
increases. 
 
 
5. The marginal cost of equity k increases (higher risk premium) 
That is for θ = 'k
dE
dk ≡  the marginal cost of equity, we obtain by differentiation of 
(6) and (7): 0
'
1
' 0
22
=∂∂
Π∂−=∂∂
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kr
and
kE
  
Substituting these equations in (12) yields: 
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 An increase in the marginal cost of equity 
dE
dk  has a similar effect to a decrease in λ, 
see (3). Thus as EE’ shifts down E will decline, as equity becomes more expensive r0 
will be increased to attract additional deposits. See Figure 3b. 
 
6. The probability of bank solvency increases 
The most important developments in banking in recent years have been: consolidation 
mainly through mergers and acquisitions; globalization and deregulation, which 
removed barriers in banking. These developments affect the risk exposure of banks 
mainly credit risk and market risks and thus also impact the insolvency risk of banks. 
See Paroush (1995) on the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the safety and 
soundness of the banking system, Saunders and Cornnet (2003) for a discussion of the 
risks faced by financial intermediaries. A change in systemic risk may also be due to 
changes in the macro economic environment such as recession, inflation or shocks to the 
economy (oil crisis). See Landskroner and Ruthenberg (1985) on the effect of inflation 
risk on bank management. Another exogenous change of P may be reflected in a change 
in the rating of the bank by a rating agency. See Billet, et al. (1998).  
An exogenous change in P can be considered to be a result of a change in the factors that 
affect P other than E. P has no effect on the FOC (7) and therefore does not affect the rr’ 
line in Figure 2, following 0
0
2
=∂∂
∂
Pr
NI . We assume that an exogenous change in risk 
affects P but not the slope dP/dE. Since dΠ/dE>0 at equilibrium, the effect of an 
increase in the P on FOC (6) is similar to an increase in λ i.e. 0
2
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∂
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In order to retain equilibrium in (3) we have to reduce 
E
P
E
P
∂
Π∂+Π∂
∂ . Since WHY IS 
00
0
2
0
<∂∂
Π∂=∂
Π∂
rE
and
r
 we have to increase r0 for every E this will result in an upward 
shift in the EE’ line. That is a decrease in insolvency risk will cause a decline in the 
deposit rate r0 and an increase in E. These changes are consistent with (17), see Figure 
3a. An increase of the probability of bank insolvency (1-P) yields an inverse impact i.e. 
a decrease in E and increase of r0. 
A decline in equity and an increase in the interest on insured deposits serve as a signal of 
an increase in the bank’s risk all other things being equal. Thus an exogenous increase in 
risk (say oil prices shock) reduces P, will result in holding less equity and consequently 
a higher interest rate on insured deposits.  
Note since r1 is inversely related to E, the two interest rates move in the same direction 
as risk changes. In our extended model (Section III) rL becomes a decision variable, risk 
will also be positively related to rL. Thus, the three interest rates will be positively 
correlated. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of our comparative statics analysis. 
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Table 1: Effects of parameter changes on optimal values of variables
 
Event/ Variable E r0 D0 D1and 
D1/(D1+D0) 
1: λ↑ + - - + 
2: λ risk adjusted - + + - 
3:Competition↑ - + + - 
4:Mkt.Discipline↑ + - - + 
5: Equity cost ↑ - + + - 
6: bank risk ↓ + - - + 
 
The upward shift in the EE’ line in figure 3a, causing an increase in E and a decline in r0, 
reflects the result of event: 1,4 and6 
The downward shift in the EE’ line in figure 3b, causing a decline in E and a rise in r0, 
reflects the result of event: 2 and 5.The upward shift in the rr’ line in figure 3c, causing a 
decline in E and a rise in r0, reflects the result of event: 3. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
We have obtained o far the impact of several parameters on E and r0 (and therefore also 
on D0). We now obtain the effects of the parameters on the optimal quantities of 
deposits:D1 and D1/(D0+D1) . In order to do that we need the results of two propositions, 
which are formulated and proven in Appendix B. A compact summary of Proposition 2 
and Corollary 3 of Proposition 1 is given in the following theorem: 
Theorem: If the degree of market discipline is sufficiently large then the effect of a 
change in any parameter on D1 and on D1/(D0+D1) is opposite to its effect on D0.  
In particular, an exogenous increase in the bank’s insolvency risk will result in a shift 
from uninsured deposits to insured deposits. The results of the last column of Table 1 are 
thus obtained; in all cases where insured deposits decline (increase) as a result of a 
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decline (increase) in their own interest rate, the uninsured deposits increase (decline) in 
absolute and relative terms. 
 
We now refer to the empirical literature where the findings of the studies can serve as 
statistical test of our theoretical hypotheses derived from the comparative statics analysis.  
These findings validate our model as a useful framework for analyzing and explaining the 
phenomena of market discipline and its effects.  
Recently studies have focused on the price and quantity effects of market discipline using 
bank debt yields and quantities of insured vs. uninsured deposits data, most have found a 
significant market effect. Specifically as predicted by our model subordinated debt (i.e. 
uninsured liability) spreads were found in the U.S. and Europe to reflect bank risk. 
Studies that tested the effects of market discipline on interest rates are cited at the end of 
the next section.  
A number of empirical studies examine the quantity effects of exogenous changes in risk, 
probability of insolvency, on the behavior of insured vs. uninsured deposits. Billet et al. 
(1998) examine the relationship between changes in bank credit risk and the use of 
insured deposits, they find that downgrading of banks debt by Moody’s (increase in 
probability of bank default) increases their use of insured deposits, symmetrically banks 
reduce their use of insured deposits following upgrades. This consistent with the results 
presented in Table1 (case 6). Park and Peristani (1998) empirical findings suggest a price 
and quantity effect which is more pronounced: riskier thrifts not only paid higher interest 
rates on uninsured deposits but also attracted a smaller quantity of uninsured deposits. 
Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) find that failed thrifts had declining proportions of 
uninsured deposits to total deposits and a lower proportion of uninsured deposits to total 
deposits prior to failure than solvent institutions, the empirical results indicate that 
uninsured deposits will have incentives to monitor and discipline thrifts risk exposure and 
that reducing deposit insurance limits will increase market discipline. These findings are 
consistent with our analytical results as presented in the comparative statics analysis. The 
empirical findings on the price effects: effects on interest rates on insured vs. uninsured 
deposits will be discussed in the next section. 
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III. Asset and Liability Management Model 
We now turn to the analysis where the bank is managing both its assets and liabilities 
(ALM), thus relaxing the assumption that total assets are fixed. Assume that the bank has 
two types of assets: risky loans (say commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans), 
which are assumed to be equally risky, and riskless securities (U.S. government and 
agencies). We assume that the bank possesses some monopolistic power in the loan 
market so that the demand for risky loans L is negatively related to the interest rate on 
these loans rL. The quantity of the riskless securities S, is assumed fixed for sake of 
simplicity.  The operating costs associated with the size of the bank are assumed to be a 
function of total assets, C (L+S)10. The relevant measure of the risk faced by the bank is 
now the risk adjusted equity capital ratio e=E/L. In terms of the 1988 Basel Accord on 
capital adequacy we assume the risk weights of the risky loans equal one and that of the 
securities to be zero. In our model E is a market or economic value and not an accounting 
value. The risk adjusted equity capital ratio reflects the (inverse of) risk of default of the 
assets and the financial leverage of the bank. Thus as the risk adjusted capital ratio 
increases the interest rate demanded by the uninsured depositors, r1(e) declines. 
 
The decision variables of the bank are now: e, r0 and rL where S is assumed fixed. 
The bank’s objective function under the extended model can now be written as: 
 
( )[ ]{ }
( )( ) )18()()()()()()(
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Rewriting (18): 
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sLL
L
+−+−−=Π
+−−−+−Π= λ
 
where we have substituted the following budget constraint 
)19()()()1()()()( 00001 SrDrLereLrDrLSD LLL +−−=−−+=   
                                                 
10 Note that C(L+S) may have a jump at L=E/α where α is the capital adequacy requirement imposed by 
the supervisory authority. 
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Note that in order to have in internal solutions equilibrium we must have r1(e)>r0 
otherwise no insured deposits will be raised; and rL>r1(e)(1-e) in order to have positive 
net income from loans.  
The first order conditions follow.  The FOC w.r.t the equity capital ratio e is 
)20(0)( =−+Π+Π
de
dkrL
de
dP
de
dP
Lλ  
where 
[ ]
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Note 0>Π
de
d  since the market discipline 0
1
11 <=
r
e
de
drr
eη . Recall the negative 
relationship between the risk adjusted capital ratio and the interest rate paid on the 
uninsured deposits. 
 
The FOC w.r.t. r0 is the same as in (7) and also the result of (8) about the effect of the 
elasticity of supply of uninsured deposits on the spread between the uninsured and 
insured deposit rates holds, where e replaces E. 
 
The FOC w.r.t. rL:   
)22(0)1()1(PrPr 1 =⎥⎦
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dC
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dkee
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Equation (22) can also be written as an equality of the marginal revenue and marginal 
cost of rL: 
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Where  1−<LrLη  is the elasticity of the demand for loans L w.r.t. rL. The LHS of (23) is 
the expected marginal revenue and on the RHS we have three components of marginal 
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costs: the expected cost of uninsured deposits and deposit insurance premium adjusted by 
(1-e) which reflects the ratio of loans financed by deposits, the marginal operating costs 
and finally the increasing equity costs. Note that L increase where e=E/L is constant.  
 
Comparative Statics Analysis 
 
A complete comparative statics analysis is quite cumbersome and therefore will not be 
presented here. We have however derived explicit results w.r.t the parameters λ and P 
that are of particular interest. Appendix C presents the formal derivation of the results. 
 
Specifically consider the impact of a change in the deposit insurance premium, i.e. θ=λ, 
we obtain 
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It is plausible that an increase in the deposit insurance premium will increase equity 
financing or reduce risk of assets.  
Thus an increase in λ will increase e, reduce r0 and rL and reuce the quantity of both 
deposits.  
Now let us consider the probability P as parameter ((1-P) is probability of insolvency of 
bank): θ = P, and find out: 
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Thus the effect of P will be exactly as that of λ. For instance, as before, an increase in 
risk will reduce e, it will also increase r0 ,rL and also D0, and by the budget constraint it 
will reduce D1 and D1/(D0+D1). 
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Two results are obtained from the analysis. First, the directions of the effects of λ and P 
on the optimal values of e and r0 under the extended model are identical to those under 
the restricted model (w.r.t. E and r0), to wit de/dλ>0, de/dP>0, dr0/dλ<0 and dr0/dP<0 
which is not surprising. Second a change in λ and P has the same effect on rL and r0 and 
thus a positive relationship between rL and r0 is obtained. Such a relationship is 
compatible with empirical findings. In addition (24c) shows that the impact of λ and P on 
the spread rL-r0 is most likely to be positive. The findings here, as in the previous model, 
are that risk affects similarly r1 and r0. 
A group of studies tested the effects of market discipline on interest rates (price effect). 
Subordinated debt spreads were found in the U.S. to be associated with bank risk. In an 
empirical analysis Evanoff and Wall (2001) compare various capital ratios and 
subordinated debt spreads as measures of risk and in predicting bank conditions, their 
results suggest that sub-debt yield spreads perform better than the best capital ratios. The 
authors conclude that the spreads can be used as “prompt corrective action” trigger. The 
time-series findings of Hancock and Kwast (2001) indicate that subordinated debt 
spreads of liquid bonds traded in a robust bond market can be used as measures of default 
risk, their results support the use of subordinated debt spreads in supervisory monitoring. 
Morgan and Stiroh (2001) investigate the relationship between bond spreads and the risk 
of the assets held by the bank, their results show that bond spreads reflect the overall mix 
of bank assets, they conclude that a shift of a bank to riskier activities will result in a 
higher spread that the bank will have to pay. 11 Similar results are obtained also for other 
countries, Sironi (2002) investigated empirically the spreads of subordinated notes and 
debentures of major US banks and European banks, she finds a significant spread/rating  
relationship for European banks’ bonds which is similar to U.S. banks; Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) found that during the 1980s and 1990s depositors in Argentina, Chile 
and Mexico disciplined banks by withdrawing deposits and requiring higher interest 
rates. 
 
                                                 
11 Saunders (2001) criticizes the use of bond spread yields as they reflect not only default probability but 
also recovery rates and advocates the use of the more liquid equity market data rather than debt market 
data. 
 24
IV. Main Results and Concluding Remarks 
 This paper focuses on market discipline that is defined as the “direct effect” of the risk of 
the bank’s assets and its capital structure on the cost of its funds. We suggest a definition 
as well as the measurement of the “degree of market discipline” as the sensitivity 
(elasticity) of the cost of uninsured deposits with respect to the capital structure adjusted 
for the risk of the bank’s assets. It turns out that the “degree of market discipline” plays 
an important role in the management of banks. Within a stylized model of the optimal 
behavior of a bank we incorporates the characteristics of the regulatory structure and 
market discipline. Government regulation is introduced via deposit insurance provided to 
some of the depositors. We examine and derive the effects of several parameters on the 
optimal behavior of the bank, and relate them to recent developments in US banking. We 
have considered the effect of changes deposit insurance premium and risk adjusted 
premium, degree of market discipline, degree of competition in the financial sector, cost 
of equity and risk as reflected by the probability of insolvency of the bank. An increase in 
the insurance premium, increase in market discipline and a decrease in risk (increase in 
probability of solvency) will result in a greater amount of equity of the bank and a lower 
rate paid on insured deposits. On the other hand an increase in the cost of equity and 
increase in competition in the insured deposits market, will cause a decline in equity 
financing and increase in the rate paid on insured deposits.  
We also derive the effect of the parameters on the quantities of deposits and their 
composition. An increase in the risk of the bank, an introduction of risk adjusted 
insurance premium and an increase competition in the insured deposits market will cause 
a reduction in the relative share of uninsured deposits (and increase of insured deposits) 
of the bank. An increase in the insurance premium (charged on all deposits) and in 
market discipline will result in an increase in the optimal relative share of uninsured 
deposits.  
 The main results (effects of the parameters) obtained under the constrained model where 
the bank manages only its liabilities are still valid under the more general model where 
the bank manages its assets as well as its liabilities. In addition under the extended model 
most parameters have similar impacts on the loan interest rate rL and the deposit rate r0.  
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 In most cases the analytical results of the model are compatible with existing empirical 
findings and thus can serve as a theoretical framework for explaining bank management 
decisions and for analyzing the effects of market discipline.   
 
Appendix A 
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In (A2) the inequality is due to the positive sign of the numerator (by SOC (9)), and the 
product of the two negative terms in the denominator. 
Thus the EE’ line is steeper than the rr’ line.  
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Appendix B 
 
Proposition 1 : S< R is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
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Corollary 1: A sufficient condition for  
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Proof: 
Recall that the EE’ line is steeper than the rr’ line(See Appendix A), this means that R>1 
and if S<1 we have also S<R.        Q.E.D. 
Corollary 2:  S>R is a sufficient condition for 
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Combine (B4) and (B5) to obtain (B3)     Q.E.D. 
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The inequality S>R is therefore equivalent to 
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Proposition 2:  The inequality 
 
)6(
1
1
1 B
EL
E
D
r
r
E −> θ
θ
η
ηη  
is a necessary and sufficient condition for  
( )
)7(10
1
1 B
d
DD
Dd
sign
d
dDsign θθ
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=  
 
Proof: 
(B6) is equivalent to  
10
1
1
1
1
DD
D
d
dD
d
dr
dE
dr
+> θ
θ
 
 
which is in turn equivalent to 
 
)8(
)(
10
110
10
11 B
DD
D
d
DDd
DD
D
d
dE
d
dD
+
+=+> θθθ  
 
But note that 
 
( ) ( )
( ) )9(
)(1
)(
10
1101
10210
1
10
10
1
10
1
B
DD
D
d
DDd
d
dD
DDDD
D
d
DDd
DD
d
dD
d
DD
Dd
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+−+=+
+−+
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
θθ
θθ
θ
 
Combine (B8) and (B9) to obtain (B7)                                                                      Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C 
A comparative statics analysis under the ALM model 
 
For a change in a generic parameter θ we differentiate in turn the FOC (20), (7) and (22) 
to obtain the following system 
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Figure 1:
Optimal Equity Capital and Deposit Insurance Premium
E* is optimal equity capital if deposit insurance premium is constant
E** is optimal equity capital if deposit insurance premium is risk adjusted   
 
 
Figure 2: 
Optimal interest rate on insured deposits and equity capital 
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Figure 3 
Comparative Statics: Effects of Changes in Parameters on the Optimal Behavior of 
the Bank 
 
The upward shift of the EE’ line in Figure 3a is associated with an increase of λ (case1), 
an increase in the degree of market discipline, 1rEη  (case 4), and an increase of the 
probability of survival of the bank P (risk decline) (case6). 
The downward shift of EE’ in Figure 3b is associated with the introduction of a risk 
adjusted insurance premium (case 2) and an increase in the marginal cost of equity, k’ 
(case 5) 
The upward shift in rr’ in Figure 3c is associated with an increase in competition in the 
uninsured deposit market, . 0
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